Pateicoties šadai "sakrustošanai", algoritms CORA 4.5 atšķirība no parasta algoritma CORA 1) spēs darboties ar daudzām atribūtu vērtībām, ne tikai binārām; 2) spēs darboties ar nepārtrauktām atribūtu vērtībām; 3) darbosies ar nezināmām atribūtu vērtībām; 4) izmantos ieguvuma kritēriju (gain ratio criterion) vērtīgāko pazīmju atrašanai. 
Introduction
Based on the analysis, a conclusion is made that the considered reasons for preference misrepresentation cannot make a basis to revise fundamental decision making theories. The existing difficulties can be overcome successfully through a more strict analysis o f the initial situations o f decision making and the development o f additional decision analysis methods so as to take into account the uncertainties o f probabilistic evaluations.
Analysis of basic decision making theories
Every decision making theory is aimed to develop the rules to choose a decision, optimal in a given sense, from the initial set o f alternative decisions. The concept o f optimality is related to the preference system o f the decision maker in the set o f outcomes o f alternative decisions.
The whole set o f decision making theories can be divided to three large classes: descriptive, nonnative and prescriptive theories.
A descriptive theory tries to describe the world as it is. Its quality is determined by the space over which it accurately characterizes and predicts the behavior o f real-world systems. Attempts to develop alternative normative decision choice theories have been made so as to overcome the above difficulties. These theories, however, suffer from conceptual shortcomings [Sarin, 1996] . The difficulties outlined can be overcome by sufficiently simpler techniques. Say in order to avoid the choice situation similar to that considered in the Allais problem, one has to properly account for all the factors o f the problem. This is quite a simple task for the experienced analyst.
As regards the uncertainty o f the probabilistic evaluations, it cannot be avoided in principle provided the necessary information is missing or is incomplete. It can, however, be concerned correctly with the help o f the suitable choice function. Two prescriptive approaches o f this kind are examined in [Sarin, 1996] .
If the decision maker is indifferent in choosing the alternatives, the problem is not in the decision making theory but in the decision maker himself. The preferences o f the individual can always be shifted towards the unambiguous choice by incorporating additional evaluation factors.
From this it follow s that the considered problems cannot be a reason to revise the existing normative decision making theories. It is quite enough with the validated corrections o f the theories that are o f prescriptive nature.
